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THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO DWORKIN 
Michael J. Perry* 
The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed 
existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very 
moment when those who professed to believe in it were for 
the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all 
other qualities and specific relationships-except that they 
were still human. The world found nothing sacred in the ab-
stract nakedness of being human. 1 
This brief commentary is a fragment of a longer work in pro-
gress. In the longer work, I address the question whether the 
idea of human rights is ineliminably religious.z The idea of 
human rights is complex. For present purposes, it suffices to say 
that the idea of human rights is the idea that because every 
human being, simply as a human being, is sacred (has "inherent 
dignity," is "an end in himself," or the like), there are certain 
things that ought not to be done to any human being and certain 
other things that ought to be done for every human being.3 (For 
some "certain things," the "ought" or the "ought not" may be 
presumptive rather than unconditional or absolute.) The convic-
tion that every human being is sacred is thus an essential, even 
foundational, constituent of the idea of human rights. 
* Copyright © 1994, Michael J. Perry. Howard J. Thenens Chair in Law, North-
western University. 
1. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 299 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1973) (emphasis added). 
2. I have addressed the meaning of "religious" in Michael J. Perry, Love and 
Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American Politics 66-82 (Oxford U. Press, 
1991) ("Love and Power"). 
3. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (Preamble) ("the dig-
nity and worth of the human person"); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1976) (Preamble); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (1976) (Preamble) ("rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human per-
son"). These three documents together make up "The International Bill of Rights." See 
also American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) ("the essential rights 
of man are not derived from the fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are based 
upon attributes of his human personality"); American Convention on Human Rights 
(1978) (Preamble) (same) ; African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(1986) (Preamble) ("fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human 
beings"). 
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In writing recently about the question of the constitutional-
ity of abortion, Ronald Dworkin has asserted that "[w]e almost 
all accept, as the inarticulate assumption behind much of our ex-
perience and conviction, that human life in all its forms is sa-
cred . ... "4 Dworkin then observes that "[f]or some of us, [the 
sacredness of human life] is a matter of religious faith; for others, 
of secular but deep philosophical belief."s It is easy to discern a 
religious version (or versions) of the conviction that every human 
being-or, as Dworkin says, every human "life"-is sacred. But 
is there really a coherent secular version of this conviction? In 
particular, does Dworkin succeed in portraying a coherent secu-
lar version of the conviction? 
I 
I want to begin by sketching a religious version-the Chris-
tian version, or at least a Christian version-of the conviction 
that every human being is sacred. We will then be in a better 
position to see whether there is-indeed, whether there can be-
a coherent secular version of this conviction. 
For Christians the basic shape of the good life is indicated by 
the instruction given by Jesus at a Passover seder on the eve of 
his execution: "I give you a new commandment: love one an-
other; you must love one another just as I have loved you."6 The 
"one another" is radically inclusive: 
You have heard how it was said, You will love your neighbor 
and hate your enemy. But I say this to you, love your enemies 
and pray for those who persecute you; so that you may be chil-
dren of your Father in heaven, for he causes his sun to rise on 
the bad as well as the good, and sends down rain to fall on the 
upright and the wicked alike. For if you love those who love 
you, what reward will you get? Do not even the tax collectors 
do as much? And if you save your greetings for your brothers, 
are you doing anything exceptional? Do not even the gentiles 
do as much? You must therefore set no bounds to your love, 
just as your heavenly Father sets none to his.7 
4. Ronald Dworkin, Life Is Sacred. That's the Easy Part, New York Times Mag., 
May 16, 1993, at 36. 
5. Id. 
6. John 13:34. (This and the other translations here are those of The New Jerusa-
lem Bible (Doubleday, 1985)). Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power 183 (W. Kauf-
mann and R. Hollingdale tr. and W. Kaufmann ed., Random House, 1967): '"[L]ove': the 
ideal state of the herd animal that no longer wants to have enemies." 
7. Matthew 5:43-48. Cf. Nietzsche, The Will to Power at 120 (cited in note 6): "One 
drives nature out of morality when one says 'Love your enemies': for then the natural 
'Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thy enemy' in the law (in instinct) has become 
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But, why should we "love one another as I have loved you"? 
The Christian answer, nourished by what David Tracy has called 
"the analogical imagination,"s is that the Other (the outsider, the 
stranger, the alien), too, no less than onself and the members of 
one's family or tribe or nation, is a "child" of God-God the 
creator and sustainer of the universe, imag(in}ed, analogically, as 
loving "parent"9-and is therefore a "sister" or "brother." As 
Hilary Putnam has written, the moral image central to what Put-
nam calls the Jerusalem-based religions "stresse[ s] equality and 
also fraternity, as in the metaphor of the whole human race as 
One Family, of all women and men as sisters and brothers."w 
At the beginning of its "Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social 
Teaching and the U. S. Economy," titled Economic Justice for 
All, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops wrote: "This 
letter is a personal invitation to Catholics to use the resources of 
our faith, the strength of our economy, and the opportunities of 
our democracy to shape a society that better protects the dignity 
and basic rights of our sisters and brothers both in this land and 
around the world."ll In a recent essay on "The Spirituality of 
The Talmud," Ben Zion Bokser and Baruch Bokser state: "From 
this conception of man's place in the universe comes the sense of 
the supreme sanctity of all human life. 'He who destroys one 
person has dealt a blow at the entire universe, and he who saves 
or sustains one person has sustained the whole world.' "12 They 
continue: 
The sanctity of life is not a function of national origin, 
religious affiliation, or social status. In the sight of God, the 
humble citizen is the equal of the person who occupies the 
highest office. As one talmudist put it: "Heaven and earth I 
call to witness, whether it be an Israelite or pagan, man or 
woman, slave or maidservant, according to the work of every 
human being doth the Holy Spirit rest upon him." ... As the 
rabbis put it: "We are obligated to feed non-Jews residing 
meaningless; then this Jove of one's neighbor must also find a new basis (as a kind of Jove 
of God). Everywhere, God is inserted and utility withdrawn; everywhere the real origin 
of morality is denied: the veneration of nature, which lies precisely in the recognition of a 
natural morality, is destroyed at its roots-" 
8. See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination (Crossroad, 1981). 
9. In the Bible, God-Ultimate Reality-is often imaged as "parent," sometimes 
as "father," sometimes as "mother." Cf. Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery 
of God in a Feminist Theological Discourse (Crossroad, 1992). 
10. Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism 60-61 (Open Court, 1987). 
11. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All v (1986) (em-
phasis added). 
12. Baruch Bokser and Ben Zion Bokser, Introduction: The Spirituality of the Tal-
mud, in The Talmud: Selected Writings 30 (Paulist Press, 1989). 
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among us even as we feed Jews; we are obligated to visit their 
sick even as we visit the Jewish sick; we are obligated to attend 
to the burial of their dead even as we attend to the burial of 
the Jewish dead.13 
Friedrich Nietzsche was relentlessly critical of what he called 
"the concept of the 'equal value of men before God.' " That con-
cept, he wrote, 
is extraordinarily harmful; one forbade actions and attitudes 
that were in themselves among the prerogatives of the strongly 
constituted-as if they were in themselves unworthy of men. 
One brought the entire tendency of the strong into disrepute 
when one erected the protective measures of the weakest 
(those who were weakest also when confronting themselves) 
as a norm of value. 
Confusion went so far that one branded the very virtuosi 
of life (whose autonomy offered the sharpest antithesis to the 
vicious and unbridled) with the most opprobrious names. 
Even now one believes one must disapprove of a Cesare Bor-
gia; that is simply laughable. The church has excommunicated 
German emperors on account of their vices: as if a monk or 
priest had any right to join in a discussion about what a Fred-
erick II may demand of himself. A Don Juan is sent to hell: 
that is very naive. Has it been noticed that in heaven all inter-
esting men are missing?- Just a hint to the girls as to where 
they can best find their salvation.- If one reflects with some 
consistency, and moreover with a deepened insight into what a 
"great man" is, no doubt remains that the church sends all 
"great men" to hell-it fights against all "greatness of man." 
The degeneration of the rulers and the ruling classes has 
been the cause of the greatest mischief in history! Without the 
Roman Caesars and Roman society, the insanity of Christian-
ity would never have come to power. 
When lesser men begin to doubt whether higher men ex-
ist, then the danger is great! And one ends by discovering that 
there is virtue also among the lowly and subjugated, the poor 
in spirit, and that before God men are equal-which has so far 
been the non plus ultra of nonsense on earth! For ultimately, 
the higher men measured themselves according to the stan-
dard of virtue of slaves-found they were "proud," etc., found 
all their higher qualities reprehensible. 
When Nero and Caracalla sat up there, the paradox arose: 
"the lowest man is worth more than that man up there!" And 
the way was prepared for an image of God that was as remote 
13. ld. at 30-31. 
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as possible from the image of the most powerful-the god on 
the cross!t4 
167 
One might respond to the religious vision sketched here, if 
not as strongly as Nietzsche, then this way: "Even if I assume, for 
the sake of argument, that the Other is a 'child' of God and 
therefore my 'sister' or 'brother,' still, why should I love the 
Other? In particular, why should I give a damn about the well-
being of her or him who is, in some deep sense, my sister or my 
brother?" For us-or, at least, for most of us-it is a fundamen-
tal conviction, born not merely of our own experience, but of the 
experience of the historically extended communities ("tradi-
tions") that for many of us have been formative, that an impor-
tant constituent of one's own well-being-of one's authentic 
flourishing as a human being-is concern for the well-being of 
one's sisters and brothers. We believe, based on that experience, 
that a life of loving connection to one's sisters and brothers is, to 
that extent, a flourishing life and that a life of unloving-uncar-
ing-alienation from one's sisters and brothers is, to that extent, 
a withering life. This fundamental conviction about human 
good-about what it means to be (truly, fully) human, about 
what is of real and ultimate value in life, about what makes a life 
most deeply meaningfults-is, for us, bedrock; this is where our 
spade is turned.t6 There may be little of resonance for us to say, 
if indeed there is anything, to one who rejects the conviction-
which, it bears emphasis, is not necessarily a religious conviction. 
But there is this to say about one who rejects it: He is, by our 
lights, no less in the grip of a pathology of estrangement than if 
he were to reject that an important constituent of one's own well-
being is concern for the well-being of one's child, or spouse, or 
parent.t7 
14. Nietzsche, The Will to Power at 466-68 (cited in note 6). 
15. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of 
Ethics 22 (St. Lawrence Univ., 1990): "[T]o find out what our nature is seems to be one 
and the same thing as to find out what we deeply believe to be most important and indis-
pensable [in a human life]." 
16. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sec. 217 (MacMillan, 
1953) ("I have reached bedrock and this is where my spade is turned.") (quoted in Put-
nam, The Many Faces of Realism at 85 (cited in note 10)). 
17. Cf. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 403 (Belknap Press, 1981). 
Nozick describes Glaucon's challenge to Socrates in Plato's Republic as asking how being 
moral is better for the agent, apart from its external consequences. "[T]he answer that 
[Plato] puts into the mouth of Socrates is that the just man is happy because his soul is 
harmoniously ordered, because, as we would say, he has an integrated personality, 
whereas the unjust man's personality is disintegrated, and the man who represents the 
extreme of injustice is psychotic, his soul is a chaos of internal strife." J.L. Mackie, Ethics: 
Inventing Right and Wrong 190-91 (Penguin, 1977). Should we take Socrates' response 
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The serious question among us-some of whom count our-
selves religious, others of whom do not-is not whether a life of 
loving connection to our sisters and brothers is (to that extent) a 
flourishing life, but this: "Who is my sister? Who is my 
brother?"ts Or, in a different but spiritually equivalent terminol-
ogy: "Who is my neighbor?"t9-which is the very question to 
which, according to Luke's Gospel, Jesus responded with the 
Parable of the Good Samaritan.zo 
One response to the question, a religious response, is that 
the Other, too, is, in the deepest possible sense-i.e., as a child of 
God-your sister or brother. To fail to "see" the Other as sister 
or brother is (according to this religious response) to succumb to 
a kind of blindness: blindness to the true nature or being both of 
the Other and of oneself, which consists partly in a profound kin-
ship between self and Other. And to fail to love the Other as 
sister or brother-worse, to hate the Other-is to succumb to the 
pathology of estrangement; it is, to that extent, to wither as a 
human being rather than to flourish. That the estrangement is 
seriously? Bernard Williams suggests that the apparent existence of people who are both 
immoral and flourishing may be a trick of distance: "Some Renaissance grandee fills such 
a role with more style than the tawdry fascist bosses, gangsters, or tycoons who seem, 
even as objects of fantasy, to be their chief contemporary instances. Perhaps we deceive 
ourselves about the past." Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 46 
(Harv. U. Press, 1985). 
18. See James Thnstead Burtchaell, The Source of Conscience, 13 Notre Dame Mag. 
20, 20-21 (Winter 1984-85). On our neighbor always turning out to be the most unlikely 
person, see note 20 and accompanying text (Parable of the Good Samaritan). (For a 
revised version of Burtchaell's essay, and for several other illuminating essays by Father 
Burtchaell, see James Thnstead Burtchaell, The Giving and Taking of Life (U. of Notre 
Dame Press, 1989).) 
19. See Matthew 22:34-40: "But when the Pharisees heard that he had silenced the 
Sadducees they got together and, to put him to the test, one of them put a further ques-
tion, 'Master, which is the greatest commandment of the Law?' Jesus said to him, 'You 
must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your 
mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. The second resembles it: You 
must love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments hang the whole Law, 
and the Prophets too."' See also Mark 12:28-34; Luke 10:25-28. (On the relation be-
tween the two commandments, see note 7.) Cf. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and 
Wrong at 243 (cited in note 17): "D. D. Raphael, in 'The Standard of Morals,' in Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1974-75) follows Edward Ullendorff in pointing out 
that whereas 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself represents the Greek of the Septua-
gint (Leviticus 19:18) and of the New Testament, the Hebrew from which the former is 
derived means rather 'You shall treat your neighbor lovingly, for he is like yourself."' 
(Thus, Bruce Ackerman need not worry that he is being asked to love the "stranger" as 
himself. That, protests Ackerman, "[o]nly a god could do .. . : there are too many stran-
gers with too many strangenesses." Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution 
21 (Yale U. Press, 1992).) 
20. See Luke 10:29-37. In the annotation of The New Jerusalem Bible, a footnote 
appended to "Samaritan" says that "[t]he contrast is between the element in Israel most 
strictly bound to the law of love, and the heretic and stranger, ... from whom normally 
only hate could be expected." 
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radical-indeed, that it is estrangement even from "the Lord 
your God"zt-and involves the most fundamental and enduring 
failure to achieve human well-being, is emphasized in the searing 
"Last Judgment" passage of Matthew: 
When the Son of man comes in his glory, escorted by all 
the angels, then he will take his seat on his throne of glory. 
All nations will be assembled before him and he will separate 
people one from another as the shepherd separates sheep 
from goats. He will place the sheep on his right hand and the 
goats on his left. Then the King will say to those on his right 
hand, "Come, you whom my Father has blessed, take as your 
heritage the kingdom prepared for you since the foundation of 
the world. For I was hungry and you gave me food, I was 
thirsty and you gave me drink, I was a stranger and you made 
me welcome, lacking clothes and you clothed me, sick and you 
visited me, in prison and you came to see me." Then the up-
right will say to him in reply, "Lord, when did we see you hun-
gry and feed you, or thirsty and give you drink? When did we 
see you a stranger and make you welcome, lacking clothes and 
clothe you? When did we find you sick or in prison and go to 
see you?" And the King will answer, "In truth I tell you, in so 
far as you did this to one of the least of these brothers of mine, 
you did it to me." Then he will say to those on his left hand, 
"Go away from me, with your curse upon you, to the eternal 
fire prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry 
and you never gave me food, I was thirsty and you never gave 
me anything to drink, I was a stranger and you never made me 
welcome, lacking clothes and you never clothed me, sick and 
in prison and you never visited me." Then it will be their turn 
to ask, "Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty, a stran-
ger or lacking clothes, sick or in prison, and did not come to 
your help?" Then he will answer, "In truth I tell you, in so far 
as you neglected to do this to one of the least of these, you 
neglected to do it to me." And they will go away to eternal 
punishment, and the upright to eternal life.22 
The response of the Gospel to "Who is my sister or brother 
or neighbor?"-and kindred responses-are religious in the fun-
damental sense that such a response is embedded in a religious 
vision of the world and of our place in it. Of course, there are 
differences among religious visions within the relevant range-
21. See note 19. 
22. Matthew 25:31-46. In Matthew's Gospel, these are Jesus's final words to his 
disciples before the beginning of the passion narrative. Matthew 26:1-2 states: "Jesus had 
now finished all he wanted to say, and he told his disciples, 'It will be Passover, as you 
know, in two days' time, and the Son of man will be handed over to be crucified."' 
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sometimes large differences, sometimes small. The analogical 
imagination does not yield precisely the same vision in every 
time or in every place. How a person or a community arrives at a 
religious vision is a difficult question-as is the question how one 
brings another to such a vision. Moreover, different religious tra-
ditions, and even different theologies within the same broad reli-
gious tradition, proffer different answers to such questions. 
It bears emphasis that a theistic religious vision does not 
necessarily include a conception of "God" as a kind of divine 
legislator, issuing directives for human conduct. (Indeed, a reli-
gious person may well believe that such a "God"-such an idol-
is dead.zJ) The imperative to "love one another as I have loved 
you" can be understood (and in my view should be understood) 
not as a piece of divine legislation, but as a (truly, fully) human 
response to the question of how to live. However, to say that the 
response is a human one does not entail that it is not also a reli-
gious response. What makes the imperative a religious human 
response and not merely a secular one is that the response is the 
existential yield of a religious conviction about how the world 
(including we-in-the-world) hangs together: in particular, the 
conviction that the Other is, finally, one's own sister or brother-
and should receive, therefore, the gift of one's loving concem.z4 
Indeed, a theistic religious vision is not necessarily attended 
by confident, much less dogmatic, God-talk. (I have developed 
the point elsewhere.zs) If that statement seems strange, consider 
what one scholar has recently stressed about Thomas Aquinas, 
perhaps the greatest Christian theologian: 
[M]uch of [Aquinas's] doctrine about talking about God is in 
truth a carefully qualified via negativa. . . . Aquinas would 
simply agree with modern antitheists that we cannot say what 
God is; and that human language is inadequate to the claimed 
reality of God; and that there is something improper even in 
saying that God is a being. But not only does Aquinas think 
23. On the death of such a "God," see Charles Larmore, Beyond Religion and En-
lightenment, 30 San Diego L. Rev. 799 (1993). 
24. In Buddhism, the relevant conviction is that the Other-who, appearances (illu-
sions) to the contrary notwithstanding, is not really other at all, not, at any rate, in any 
deep sense-is an object of infinite compassion. (The Buddhist greeting "Namaste" 
means, roughly, "I greet the place within you where we are one.") 
25. See Perry, Love and Power at 72-73 (cited in note 2). Nor is such a vision neces-
sarily attended by belief in an afterlife. Cf. Timothy P. Jackson, The Disconsolation of 
Theology: Irony, Cruelty, and Putting Charity First, 20 J. Religious Ethics_ 1, 19 ~1~) 
(arguing that "a future heaven and/or hell ought not to play much of a role m [Chnsban] 
ethics, whatever role they may play in cosmology"). 
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that none of these admissions disqualifies him from theism; he 
actually thinks that the theist should make these admissions.26 
171 
Of course, and as Aquinas understood, to insist that we cannot 
say what God is-that we can only follow a via negativa and say 
what God is not-is not to deny that we can try to mediate our 
experience of Ultimate Reality analogically-for example, by 
speaking of God as like a loving "parent," and of the Other as 
like a "sister" or "brother." In addition to his "carefully qualified 
via negativa ... Aquinas also has, of course, a via positiva about 
God-talk, namely, the 'doctrine of analogy.' ... "27 However, to 
insist, with Aquinas, that in talking about God we must either 
follow a via negativa or speak analogically is not to say that God-
talk is merely metaphorical or figurative or poetic. Aquinas was, 
after all, a committed theological realist. 
* * * * * 
To forestall predictable misunderstanding, let me make two 
points. First, in presenting a religious version of the conviction 
that every human being is sacred, I have relied on the religious 
materials I know best. In relying primarily on Christian materi-
als, however, I do not mean to suggest that there are not ample 
materials in other religious traditions out of which one can con-
struct, or reconstruct, a relevantly similar version of the convic-
tion. Of course, just as there are differences among the precise 
religious visions adhered to by different sects within Christianity, 
there are differences among the precise visions adhered to by dif-
ferent world religions. (Again, the analogical imagination does 
not yield precisely the same vision in every time or place.) But 
such differences as there are ought not to obscure the fact that 
the experience of all human beings as sacred is widely shared 
among different sects and religions, albeit expressed-medi-
ated-differently in different traditions. And that common ("ec-
umenical") ground helps to explain the emergence of the idea of 
human rights as a point of convergence among peoples from dif-
ferent religious traditions.zs 
26. T.DJ. Chappell, Why Read Aquinas?, Times Literary Supp., May 1, 1992, at 25 
(reviewing Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Clarendon Press, 1992}). 
27. See Chappell, Why Read Aquinas? at 25 (cited in note 26). 
28. See Dan Cohn-Sherbok, ed., World Religions and Human Liberation (Orbis, 
1992); Hans KOng and JOrgen Moltmann, eds., The Ethics of World Religions and Human 
Rights (Trinity Press, 1990); Leroy S. Rouner, ed., Human Rights and the World's Reli-
gions (U. of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Arlene Swidler, ed., Human Rights in Religious 
Traditions (Pilgrim Press, 1982); Robert lraer, Faith in Human Rights: Support in Reli-
gious Traditions for a Global Struggle (Georgetown U. Press, 1991). 
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Second, in presenting a religious version of the conviction 
that every human being is sacred, and in relying primarily on 
Christian materials in doing so, I do not mean to deny that the 
lived practice, as distinct from the professed ideals, of every reli-
gious tradition, including Christianity, offers at best equivocal 
support for what we now call human rights. Indeed, I do not 
mean to deny even that the professed ideals of religious tradi-
tions-at least on some quite plausible constructions of those 
ideals-fail to support, and may even oppose, some of what we 
now think of as human rights. Christianity is a conspicuous ex-
ample. There has been an obvious tendency on the part even of 
the world's "great" religious traditions to tribalism, racism, and 
sexism. No person who takes seriously the resources of one or 
another religious tradition should deny "the brokenness and am-
biguity of every tradition" or repress "one's own inevitably am-
bivalent relationship to [the tradition]."z9 A self-critical attitude 
towards one's own tradition is "the route to liberation from the 
negative realities of [the] tradition."3o 
II 
The religious-cosmological context of the conviction that 
every human is sacred-the context I sketched in the preceding 
section-is not appealing to everyone. It was very unappealing 
to Nietzsche. And even for one to whom it is greatly appealing, 
it may not be credible. It is not credible, for example, to Jtirgen 
Habermas, who has written: 
[By confronting] the conscientious question about deliverance 
for the annihilated victims[,] we become aware of the limits of 
that transcedence from within which is directed to this world. 
But this does not enable us to ascertain the countermovement 
of a compensating transcedence from beyond. That the uni-
versal covenant of fellowship would be able to be effective ret-
roactively, toward the past, only in the weak medium of our 
memory ... falls short of our moral need. But the painful 
experience of a deficit is still not a sufficient argument for the 
assumption of an 'absolute freedom which saves in death.'31 
Even if one finds incredible the religious-cosmological con-
text of the conviction that every human being is sacred, the ques-
29. Tracy, The Analogical imagination at 105 (cited in note 8). 
30. ld. at 100. 
31. JUrgen Habermas, Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World, in 
D. Browning and F. Fiorenza, eds., Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theology 226, 238 
(1992). 
1994] DWORKIN'S GOSPEL 173 
tion persists whether the religious version of the conviction is the 
only coherent version. Can there be a coherent secular version-
a version not finally rooted in a religious vision of the world and 
of our place in it? Can the conviction be embedded either in a 
nonreligious cosmology or in cosmological agnosticism?32 Con-
sider Glenn Tinder's statement: 
Nietzsche's stature is owing to the courage and profundity 
that enabled him to make all this unmistakably clear. He de-
lineated with overpowering eloquence the consequences of 
giving up Christianity, and every like view of the universe and 
humanity. His approval of those consequences and his hatred 
of Christianity give force to his argument. Many would like to 
think that there are no consequences-that we can continue 
treasuring the life and welfare, the civil rights and political au-
thority, of every person without believing in a God who ren-
ders such attitudes and conduct compelling. Nietzsche shows 
that we cannot. We cannot give up the Christian God-and 
the transcendence given other names in other faiths-and go on 
as before. We must give up Christian morality too. If the 
God-man is nothing more than an illusion, the same thing is 
true of the idea that every individual possesses incalculable 
worth. The standard of agape collapses. It becomes explicable 
only on Nietzsche's terms: as a device by which the weak and 
failing exact from the strong and distinguished a deference 
they do not deserve. Thus the spiritual center of Western poli-
tics fades and vanishes.33 
32. Real moralities-the moralities that various human communities have actually 
lived-have always been cosmologically embedded: In every human community across 
time and space, "moral norms are closely linked to beliefs about the facts of human life 
and the world in which human life is set. . . . To know what people find good in human 
action, we must know something about the powers and vulnerabilities they find character-
istically human, and about how they explain the constraints that nature, power, finitude, 
and mortality impose on persons. . . . [W]hen they formulate moral norms and impose 
them on themselves and others[, persons] are trying to formulate relationships between 
realities and human purposes that allow them 'to live as [they] would in a world that is the 
way it is."' Robin W. Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, Focus Introduction, 14 J. Religious 
Ethics 48,56-57 (1986). See Robin W. Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, "In the Beginning," 
in R. Lovin and F. Reynolds, eds., Cosmogony and Ethical Order: New Studies in Com-
parative Ethics 1 (U. of Chicago Press, 1985). 
33. Glenn Tinder, On The Political Meaning of Christianity: Can We Be Good with-
out God?, Atlantic Monthly, December 1989, at 69, 80 (passages rearranged and empha-
sis added). Tinder's emphasis on the Christian tradition will surely and understandably 
be, for some non-Christians, a provocative distraction from his fundamental point. Tin-
der's (and Nietzsche's) point loses nothing, however, if the emphasis is placed not on the 
Christian tradition but on the Jewish, for example. Recall the comment on the Talmud 
quoted earlier in this chapter. Nor does the point lose anything if the emphasis is put, for 
example, on the (Mahayana) Buddhist tradition, with its insistence on compassion for all 
sentient creatures as the fitting response to the true-as distict from the illusory-nature 
of the world. 
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Is Tinder right? We may agree with Charles Larmore that 
morality is now widely understood (or, at least, understood by 
many of us, religious or not, who read pieces like this one) to be 
independent of a God conceived of as the supreme morallegisla-
tof.34 But is it plausible to think that morality can be independ-
ent of any cosmological convictions-any convictions about how 
the world (including we-in-the-world) hangs together? After 
Nietzsche, is it plausible to think that a morality embedded in 
religious convictions about how the world hangs together can be 
more or less equivalent to a morality embedded in the conviction 
that the world is nothing but a great cosmic process utterly bereft 
of ultimate meaning and therefore, from a human point of view, 
absurd?Js ("There is no moral meaning hidden in the bowels of 
the universe."36) Nietzsche declared: "'Naivete: as if morality 
could survive when the God who sanctions it is missing! The 'be-
yond' absolutely necessary if faith in morality is to be main-
tained."37 Writing recently of "anthropocentrism, [which] by 
abolishing all horizons of significance, threatens us with a loss of 
meaning and hence a trivialization of our predicament," Charles 
Taylor has said: "At one moment, we understand our situation as 
one of high tragedy, alone in a silent universe, without intrinsic 
meaning, condemned to create value. But at a later moment, the 
same doctrine, by its own inherent bent, yields a flattened world, 
in which there aren't very meaningful choices because there 
aren't any crucial issues."Js 
Consider a cosmology according to which the world is, fi-
nally and radically, meaningless-or, even if meaningful in some 
sense, not meaningful in a way hospitable to our deepest yearn-
ings for what Abraham Heschel called "ultimate relationship, ul-
timate belonging."39 Consider, for example, Clarence Darrow's 
bleak vision (as recounted by Paul Edwards): 
34. See Larmore, 30 San Diego L. Rev. at 000-00 (cited in note 23). 
35. Cf. Nietzsche, The Will to Power at 169 (cited in note 6): 
Man a little, eccentric species of animal, which-fortunately-has its day; 
all on earth a mere moment, an incident, an exception without consequences, 
something of no importance to the general character of the earth; the earth it-
self, like every star, a hiatus between two nothingness, an event without plan, 
reason, will, self-consciousness, the worst kind of necessity, stupid necessity-
Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity says to us: "all that 
must be false, for it arouses indignation- Could all that not be merely appear-
ance? And man, in spite of all, as Kant says-" 
36. Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 368 {Yale U. Press, 1980). 
37. Nietzsche, The Will to Power at 147 (cited in note 6). 
38. Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity 68 (Harv. U. Press, 1992). 
39. Abraham J. Hesche!, Who Is Man? 75 (Stanford U. Press, 1965). See Nozick, 
Philosophical Explanations at 586 (cited in note 17): "If the cosmic role of human bei?gs 
was to provide a negative lesson to some others {'don't act like them') or to provide 
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Darrow, one of the most compassionate men who ever lived, 
... concluded that life was an "awful joke." ... Darrow of-
fered as one of his reasons the apparent aimlessness of all that 
happens. "This weary old world goes on, begetting, with birth 
and with living and with death," he remarked in his moving 
plea for the boy-murderers Loeb and Leopold, "and all of it is 
blind from the beginning to the end." Elsewhere he wrote: 
"Life is like a ship on the sea, tossed by every wave and by 
every wind; a ship headed for no port and no harbor, with no 
rudder, no compass, no pilot; simply floating for a time, then 
lost in the waves." In addition to the aimlessness of life and 
the universe, there is the fact of death. "I love my friends," 
wrote Darrow, "but they all must come to a tragic end." 
Death is more terrible the more one is attached to things in 
the world. Life, he concludes, is "not worth while," and he 
adds ... that "it is an unpleasant interruption of nothing, and 
the best thing you can say of it is that it does not last long. "40 
175 
One prominent contemporary proponent of a Darrowian cos-
mology, the physicist (and Nobel laureate) Steven Weinberg, 
"finds his own world-view 'chilling and impersonal.' He cannot 
understand people who treat the absence of God and of God's 
heaven as unimportant."4t 
needed food for passing intergalactic travelers who were important, this would not suit 
our aspirations-not even if afterwards the intergalactic travelers smacked their lips and 
said that we tasted good." 
40. Paul Edwards, Life, Meaning and Value of, 4 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 467, 
468 (MacMillan and The Free Press, 1967). Whether Clarence Darrow was in fact "one of 
the most compassionate men who ever lived" is open to serious question. For a revision-
ist view of Darrow, see Gary Wills, Under God: Religion and American Politics 97-114 
(Simon & Schuster, 1990). 
41. John Leslie, Is it all quite simple? The physicist's search for a Theory of Every-
thing, Times Literary Supp., Jan. 29, 1993, at 3 (reviewing, inter alia, Steven Weinberg, 
Dreams of a Final Theory (Hutchinson, 1992) ). Cf. Paul Davies, The Holy Grail of Phys-
ics, New York Times Book Rev., Mar. 7, 1993, at 11 (reviewing, inter alia, Weinberg's 
book): "Reductionism [in physics) may be a fruitful research method, but it is a bleak 
philosophy. . . . If the world is but a collection of inert atoms interacting through blind 
and purposeless forces, what happens to ... the meaning of life?" For a controversial 
critique of such scientific reductionism, see Bryan Appleyard, Understanding the Present: 
Science and the Soul of Modern Man (Picador, 1992). On philosophical inquiry into cos-
mology, see Derek Parfit, The puzzle of reality, Times Literary Supp., July 3, 1992, at 3. 
Several recent papers in a fierce and ongoing debate about the consistency or incon-
sistency of claims made in evolutionary biology with Christian claims are relevant here. 
All the papers are by persons who identify themselves as Christians. In the September 
1991 issue of Christian Scholar's Review, see Alvin Plantinga, When Faith and Reason 
Clash: Evolution and the Bible; Howard Van Till, When Faith and Reason Cooperate; 
Eman McMullin, Plantinga's Defense of Special Creation; Alvin Plantinga, Evolution, 
Neutrality, and Antecedent Probability: A Reply to Van Till and McMullin. In the June/ 
July 1993 issue of First Things, see Howard Van Till and Phillip E. Johnson, God and 
Evolution: An Exchange. 
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Where in a cosmological view like Weinberg's can the con-
viction that every human being is sacred (has inherent dignity, is 
an end in himself, etc.) gain a foothold? Indeed, embedded in 
the view that the world is merely a process devoid of ultimate 
meaning, what would the conviction that every human being is 
sacred even mean? If the only coherent version of the conviction 
is religious-if indeed the only intelligible version is religious-
then cosmological agnosticism, which neither affirms nor denies 
the ultimate meaningfulness of the world, entails agnosticism 
about the sacredness vel non of human beings. 
* * * * * 
Let us return to Dworkin's statement that although for some 
of us the sacredness of human life "is a matter of religious faith," 
for others it is a matter "of secular but deep philosophical be-
lief."42 Now, many folks who believe that every human being is 
sacred do not count themselves religious; some of them even em-
brace nonreligious views like Weinberg's. The question nonethe-
less persists whether there is a coherent secular version of the 
conviction about the sacredness of every human being. Imagine 
a nonreligious person saying: "That every human being is sacred 
is not, for me, a religious tenet; it is a secular but deep philosoph-
ical belief." We may ask: "Please tell us something about the 
constellation of views-views about how the world, including we-
in-the-world, hangs together-in which, for you, that philosophi-
cal belief is embedded." Imagine this answer: "For me the con-
viction that every human being is sacred is not only axiomatic; it 
is unconnected to any of my views about how the world hangs 
together." (Perhaps the answer includes this statement: "I have 
no confident views about how the world hangs together. I'm ag-
nostic about all such 'religious' or 'cosmological' matters.") It 
seems, then, that the premise that every human being is sacred is, 
for our nonreligious interlocutor, less a conviction about (a part 
of) the world than a kind of free-floating aesthetic preference. In 
Dworkin's view, however, the premise is, even for most nonreli-
gious persons who hold it, much more than an aesthetic 
preference. 
In his recent book, Life's Dominion: An Argument about 
Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freeedom, Dworkin writes 
that "one of [his] main claims [is] ... that there is a secular as 
well as a religious interpretation of the idea that human life is 
42. Dworkin, Life is Sacred. That's the Easy Pan at 36 (cited in note 4). 
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sacred."43 Dworkin purports to explain, in his book, how the 
conviction that every human being (or, as Dworkin says, "life") is 
sacred "may be, and commonly is, interpreted in a secular as well 
as in a conventionally religious way."44 To say that a human life 
is sacred is partly to say, according to Dworkin, "that it has in-
trinsic and objective value quite apart from any value it might 
have to the person whose life it is."4s Emphasizing in particular 
the notion of "intrinsic" value, Dworkin writes: "[M]uch of our 
life is based on the idea that objects or events can be valuable in 
themselves. . . . [T]he idea that some events or objects are valua-
ble in and of themselves ... is ... a familiar part of our experi-
ence. . . . The idea of intrinsic value is commonplace, and it has a 
central place in our shared scheme of values and opinions .... 
Something is intrinsically valuable ... if its value is independent 
of what people happen to enjoy or want or need or what is good 
for them. "46 
Dworkin's comments about "intrinsic" value obscure rather 
than clarify that value is always and everywhere value for some-
one(s) or something(s). The notion of something being valuable 
independently of a beneficial relation to anyone or anything-
whether a human being, a nonhuman but living entity, or God-
is perfectly opaque. Putting aside things that are values either 
for nonhuman entities or for God, we may say that "the category 
43. Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, 
and Individual Freedom 195 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1993) ("Life's Dominion"). 
44. Id. at 25. Curiously, elsewhere in his book Dworkin writes that that he "can 
think of no plausible account of the content that a belief must have in order to be deemed 
religious that would rule out convictions about why and how human life [is sacred), except 
the abandoned notion that religious belief must presuppose a god." ld. at 163. He also 
says that "why and how human life is sacred" is an essentially religious issue. ld. at 165. 
It is not obvious why, if (as Dworkin insists) there is a secular interpretation or version of 
the idea that human life is sacred, the issue of why and how human life is sacred is essen-
tially religious. If the idea that human life is sacred is not essentially religious, why is the 
issue of why and how human life is sacred essentially religious? Dworkin's principal in-
centive to claim that the idea that human life is sacred can be interpreted in a secular as 
well as in a religious way is that, for purposes of his characterization of the abortion 
controversy, he wants to be able to attribute the idea (in its secular version) to secular 
folks as well as (in its religious version) to religious ones. His principal incentive to claim 
that the issue of why and how human life is sacred is essentially religious is that, for 
purposes of his argument about the (un)constitutionality of restrictive abortion legisla-
tion, Dworkin wants to be able to rely on a constitutional premise according to which 
government may not take coercive action predicated on nothing more than a contested 
position on an essentially religious issue. See id. at 160-68. That there is such a constitu-
tional premise is open to question. Cf. Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political 
Choice: Further Thoughts-and Second Thoughts-on Love and Power, 30 San Diego L. 
Rev. 703 (1993).} 
45. Dworkin, Life is Sacred. That's the Easy Part at 36 (emphasis added} (cited in 
note 4). 
46. Dworkin, Life's Dominion at 69-71 (cited in note 43). 
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of values is anthropocentric, in that it corresponds to interests 
which can only take root in creatures with something approach-
ing our own affective make-up. . . . [V]alues are only ascribable 
from points of view constituted by human patterns of affective 
response. A wholly dispassionate eye would be as blind to them 
as a black-and-white camera to chromatic colours."47 The rele-
vant distinction here is between "intrinsic" value and "instru-
mental" value. To say that something has intrinsic value is to say, 
not that something has value even if it has no value for anyone 
(not even God) or anything-what would that mean?-but that 
something has value for someone (or something) not merely as a 
means to an end but as an end in itself. And to say that something 
has "objective" value and not (or not merely) "subjective" value 
is to say that something has value for someone (for example, that 
it is good for her, that it is conducive to or perhaps even consti-
47. A.W. Price, Varieties of Objectivity and Values, 83 Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y 103, 
106 (1983). See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 469 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
Clarendon, 2d ed. 1978): "Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, 
heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but 
perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be 
regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; tho', like that too, it 
has little or no influence on practice." See also Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on 
Dean Clark, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1748, 1755 (1989): "[The view] that there are goods which 
are not the goods of any human beings at all, is likely to appear ... wholly unintelligible, 
for it conflicts with what is perhaps the deepest and most widely shared orthodoxy of 
modern moral thought-the assumption that only the goods of human beings (or perhaps 
sentient beings) count in assessing different practices and institutions." Cf. Robin W. 
Lovin, Empiricism and Christian Social Thought, Annual of Soc'y of Christian Ethics 25, 
41 (1982): "Ethics will never be like physics, chemistry, or certain types of sociology, 
because it understands the moral reality to be about an interaction between persons and 
the world which can only be known from the reports of those who experience that 
interaction." 
Does Dworkin disagree? It's difficult to tell. Cf. Dworkin, Life's Dominion at 248 
n.1 (cited in note 43): "I do not mean to take any position on a further, very abstract 
philosophical issue not pertinent to this discussion: whether great paintings would still be 
valuable if intelligent life were altogether destroyed forever so that no one could ever 
have the experience of regarding paintings again. There is no inconsistency in denying 
that they would have value then, because the value of a painting lies in the kind of experi-
ence it makes available, while still insisting that this value is intrinsic because it does not 
depend on any creatures' actually wanting that kind of experience." 
At one point in his discussion of "intrinsic" value, Dworkin writes: "David Hume and 
many other philosophers insisted that objects or events can be valuable only when and 
because they serve someone's or something's interests. On this view, nothing is valuable 
unless someone wants it or unless it helps someone get what he does want." Id. at 69. 
The second sentence here is a glaring non sequitur. It does not follow, from the Humean 
view, that nothing is valuable unless someone wants it or unless it helps someone get what 
he does want. It follows only that nothing is valuable unless it serves someone's or some-
thing's interests. That something serves my interests does not entail that I want it (or that 
it helps me get what I do want). After all, I may not know that something serves my 
interests, or I may not know what my real interests are. Indeed, that I want something (or 
that it helps me get what I do want) does not entail that it serves my interests: I may want 
things that are not good for me-indeed, that are bad for me. 
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tutive of her flourishing) even if she is unaware that it has value 
for her-indeed, even if she believes that it has disvalue for her.4s 
Now, that something has both objective and intrinsic value for 
someone does not mean that it is sacred. An end to my itch has 
both objective and intrinsic value for me (or so we may assume), 
but it is not thereby sacred. For some persons who count them-
selves religious, to say that every human being is sacred is to say 
(speaking analogically) that every human being is the beloved 
child of God (God who is love). For persons who do not count 
themselves religious, what does it mean to say that every human 
being is sacred? 
According to Dworkin, "[t]he nerve of the sacred lies in the 
value we attach to a process or enterprise or project rather than 
to its results considered independently from how they were pro-
duced."49 The sacredness of human beings is rooted, for nonreli-
gious persons, in two basic facts about human beings (argues 
Dworkin). First, every human being is "the highest product of 
natural creation. . . . [T]he idea that human beings are special 
among natural creations is offered to explain why it is horrible 
that even a single human individual life should be extin-
guished."so Second, "each developed human being is the product 
not just of natural creation, but also of the kind of deliberative 
human creative force that we honor in honoring art.''st "The 
idea that each individual human life is inviolable is therefore 
rooted ... in two combined and intersecting bases of the sacred: 
natural and human creation. "sz 
The life of a single human organism commands respect 
and protection, then, no matter in what form or shape, be-
cause of the complex creative investment it represents and be-
cause of our wonder at the ... processes that produce new 
lives from old ones, at the processes of nation and community 
and language through which a human being will come to ab-
sorb and continue hundreds of generations of cultures and 
forms of life and value, and, finally, when mental life has be-
gun and flourishes, at the process of internal personal creation 
and judgment by which a person will make and remake him-
self, a mysterious, inescapable process in which we each par-
ticipate, and which is therefore the most powerful and 
48. To say that something has merely subjective value for someone is to say that she 
believes it to have value for her even though it does not. 
49. Dworkin, Life's Dominion at 78 (cited in note 43). 
50. Id. at 82. See id. at 81-84. 
51. ld. at 82. 
52. ld. at 83. 
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inevitable source of empathy and communion we have with 
every other creature who faces the same frightening challenge. 
The horror we feel in the willful destruction of a human life 
reflects our shared inarticulate sense of the intrinsic impor-
tance of each of these dimensions of investment.53 
This, then, is Dworkin's rendering of a secular version of the con-
viction that every human being is sacred. Even if in truth the 
world is nothing but a process bereft of ultimate meaning, every 
human being is nonetheless sacred, according to Dworkin, be-
cause "each human being ... is a creative masterpiece"54-a 
masterpiece of "natural and human creation. "55 
Does Dworkin succeed in portraying a coherent secular ver-
sion of the conviction that every human being is sacred? Impor-
tant questions need to be answered-or so it seems to me. How 
does the fact that something is a masterpiece of natural and 
human creation make that something not merely a creative mas-
terpiece but sacred? What is the precise sense of "sacred" in 
play in Dworkin's portrayal? Let us agree that every human be-
ing is a creative masterpiece and, as such, inspires (or should in-
spire) awe in us. That something justifiably inspires awe in us, 
however-James Joyce's Ulysses, for example-entails neither 
that we believe it to be sacred nor that it i!) sacred. 
To say that every human being is sacred (and therefore invi-
olable) is ordinarily to say something about (what is believed to 
be) the true nature of every human being. Of course, something 
may inspire awe in us, and we may value it, because it is sacred 
(or, at least, because we believe it to be sacred). But to suggest, 
as in his book Dworkin at least sometimes does, that something 
is sacred because it inspires awe in us, because we value it, is to 
reverse the ordinary order of things.56 Dworkin seems to be us-
ing "sacred" in what we may call a weak, or "subjective," sense-
something (e.g. a human life) is sacred because, or in the sense 
that, it inspires awe in us and we attach great value to it-rather 
than in the strong, or "objective," sense-something is sacred 
and therefore it inspires awe in us and we attach great value to it. 
Moreover, in using "sacred" in the weak or subjective sense, 
53. ld. at 84. 
54. ld. at 82. 
55. Id. at 83. 
56. Recall, for example, Dworkin's statement that "the nerve of the sacred lies in 
the value we attach to a process or enterprise or project rather than to its results consid-
ered independently from how they were produced." Id. at 78. Or his statement that 
"[t]he life of a single human organism commands respect and protection ... because of 
our wonder at the ... processes that produce new lives from old ones ... " Id. at 84. 
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Dworkin is trading on the greater strength of the objective sense 
in which the word is ordinarily used. 
That rhetorical strategy, however, is problematic. The prem-
ise that every human being is sacred-in-the-subjective-sense can-
not begin to bear the weight of the premise that every human 
being is sacred-in-the-objective-sense. Imagine someone saying 
to a Bosnian Serb: "The Bosnian Muslim, too, no less than you, is 
sacred. It is wrong for you to rape her." If "sacred" is meant in 
the subjective sense, the Bosnian Serb may reply: "Sacred to you 
and yours, perhaps, but not to me and mine. In the scheme of 
things, we happen not to attach much value to her life." By con-
trast, "sacred" in the objective sense is not fundamentally a mat-
ter of "sacred to you" or "sacred to me"; it is, rather, a matter of 
how things really are. (Of course, one may disbelieve the ontol-
ogy, but that's a different problem.) If every human being is 
sacred in the objective sense, then, in violating the Bosnian Mus-
lim, the Bosnian Serb does not merely violate what some of us 
attach great value to; he violates the very order of creation. 
Now, Dworkin may insist that he's been misunderstood. He 
may insist that he means "sacred" in the objective sense, and that 
on his account of "sacred" the Bosnian Serb is indeed violating 
the very order of creation. He may say that the Bosnian Muslim 
has intrinsic value even for the Bosnian Serb-and objective 
value too: that the welfare of the Bosnian Muslim is an intrinsic 
good for the Bosnian Serb even if the Bosnian Serb will remain 
forever unaware of that fact. But if Dworkin wants to respond in 
some such way, then he must forswear any explanation of the 
sacredness of someone or something in terms of, or by reference 
to, "the value we attach to" that someone or something. He 
must explain it solely in other terms. It is not clear, however, 
what that other explanation might be; in particular, it is not obvi-
ous that either a secular cosmology or cosmological agnosticism 
can yield the requisite conviction about how things really are. 
How do we get from "the universe is (or might be) nothing but a 
cosmic process bereft of ultimate meaning" to "every human be-
ing is nonetheless sacred (in the strong or objective sense)"? Of 
course, even in an absurd universe, a universe bereft of transcen-
dent meaning, there can be creative masterpieces. But, again, 
that something is a creative masterpiece and understandably in-
spires awe in us entails neither that it is sacred nor even that we 
believe it to be sacred (in the strong sense). 
Has Dworkin identified a coherent secular version of the 
conviction that every human being is sacred? It seems not, if "sa-
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erect" is meant in the objective sense. If, however, "sacred" is 
meant in the subjective sense, perhaps Dworkin has identified a 
coherent secular version. But if he has, Dworkin's secularized 
claim that every human being is sacred is a substantially weaker 
claim than the paradigmatic claim about the sacredness of all 
human beings. In any event, Dworkin has said nothing to dimin-
ish suspicion that the conviction that every human being is sa-
cred-sacred in the strong/objective sense, sacred because of 
how the world really is, and not because of what we attach value 
to in the world-is inescapably religious. The challenge is to 
identify a coherent secular version of that conviction. In his re-
view of Dworkin's book for the London Times Literary Supple-
ment, Robert Grant concluded that "[i]n Life's Dominion, 
Professor Dworkin makes considerable play with, indeed frankly 
exploits, the idea of the sacred, but shows no understanding of 
it. "57 
Ill 
Let me emphasize that nothing I have said here-nothing at 
all-is meant to defend, as credible or even as appealing, any 
particular religious-cosmological beliefs or any religious-moral 
beliefs, much less to commend any such beliefs to anyone. One 
certainly need not count oneself a religious person in order to 
57. Robert Grant, Abortion and the Idea of the Sacred, Times Literary Supplement, 
June 18, 1993, at 11. 
Martha Nussbaum has asserted, in a recent essay, that "the good of other human 
beings is an end worth pursuing in its own right, apart from its effect on [one's] own 
pleasure or happiness." Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism about Practical Reason in Liter-
ature and the Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 714, 718 (1994). (It is clear in the context of her 
work that by "other human beings" Nussbaum is referring not just to some other human 
beings but to all other human beings.) But why is the good of each and every human 
being an end worth pursuing in its own right? Nussbaum doesn't say. She merely reports, 
in the final paragraph of her essay, that "it seems to be a mark of the human being to care 
for others and feel disturbance when bad things happen to them." Id. at 744. Now, few 
will deny that it seems to be a mark of the human being to care for some other human 
beings-the members of one's family, say, or even of one's tribe or nation or race or 
religion. But it is painfully clear that it is not a mark of all human beings-it is not a mark 
of "the human being" as such-to care for all other human beings. If it were a mark of all 
human beings to care for all other human beings (and to feel disturbance when bad things 
happen to them), the "why" question would lack urgency. But because very many human 
beings-indeed, perhaps most human beings-have not in the past cared for, nor do they 
today care for, all other human beings, the question is urgent: Why is the good of each 
and every human being an end worth pursuing in its own right? Nussbaum says nothing, 
in her essay, of relevance to that question. One answer-the answer that informs the 
international law of human rights-is that the good of each and every human being is an 
end worth pursuing in its own right because each and every human being is sacred. My 
suggestion here is that there may be no coherent secular vision of that answer-no coher-
ent secular version of the conviction that every human being is sacred. 
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wonder-indeed, one can be one of those "good many professors 
and other intellectuals [who] display a hostility or skeptical indif-
ference to religion that amounts to a thinly disguised contempt 
for belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific in-
quiry and ordinary human experience"ss and nonetheless won-
der-whether the conviction that every human being is sacred 
isn't inescapably religious. One need not count oneself religious 
in order to wonder whether much secular moral-philosophizing 
hasn't been, for a very long time now, a kind of whistling in the 
dark.s9 
Nietzsche asked: "Now suppose that belief in God has van-
ished: the question presents itself anew: 'who speaks?' "60 Echo-
ing Nietzsche's question a brutal century later, Art Leff wrote: 
Napalming babies is bad. 
Starving the poor is wicked. 
Buying and selling each other is depraved. 
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, 
Amin, and Pol Pot-and General Custer too-have earned 
salvation. 
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned. 
There is in the world such a thing as evil. 
[All together now:] Sez who? 
God help us.61 
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